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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

THOMAS PARRISH,

:

Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 930770-CA
Priority No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f)

(1992), whereby the defendant in a Circuit

Court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final order for anything other than a first degree or
capital

felony.

In this case, Appellant was found guilty of

Battery, a class B misdemeanor, and sentenced in a bench trial by
the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, Judge of the Third Circuit
Court, Salt Lake City Department, State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue before this Court and standard of review is as
follows:
1.
error

Did

the

trial

court

in Appellant's

commit

trial

for

reversible
Battery

by

allowing evidence of his prior conviction of
Disorderly Conduct?
The admission of evidence is a question of law and is reviewed
for correctness, however, the trial court's subsidiary

factual

determinations, if any, are given deference by the Appellate Court
and will be overruled

only when clearly erroneous.

State v.

O'Neal, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v.
Diaz, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When reviewing a trial court's balancing of the probativeness
of

the

piece

of

evidence

against

it's

potential

for

unfair

prejudice under Rule 403, the appellate court will only reverse if
the trial court's decision as a matter of law was unreasonable.
O'Neal, at 16.

2

TEXT OF PERTINENT RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion/ or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

Utah Rule of Evidence 404 provides:
Rule 404.
Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible
for the purpose
of proving
action
in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except;
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same.
(2) Character of victim.
Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.
Evidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 provides:
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence
3

of truthful character is admissible only after the character
of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion
or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific
instances of conduct.
Specific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the
accused's or the witness' privilege
against
selfincrimination when examined with respect to matters which
relate only to credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive
to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness
either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from judgment and conviction for Battery,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance
11.08.020.

Mr. Parrish was found guilty in bench trial on October

29, 1993.

Mr. Parrish was sentenced on October 29, 1993 to 180

days in jail.
on

good

The court suspended 150 days and placed Mr. Parrish

behavior

probation

for

a

period

of

one

year.

November 30, 1993, Mr. Parrish filed a Notice of Appeal.

On

Due to

excusable neglect on the part of Mr. Parrish's counsel, a Motion,
Stipulation, Order to Extend the Time for Filing the Notice of
Appeal, and a second Notice of Appeal was filed on December 29,
1993.

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The substance of the allegation against Mr. Parrish was
that he kicked his wife in the back as she lay on their bed.
During the course of the bench trial, Mr. Parrish commented on
direct examination that this was not the first time his wife had
called the police, nor was it the first time he had been arrested.
(Transcript

"T" 19) .

On cross examination the city prosecutor

elicited an admission from Mr. Parrish that this was the third time
in as many months that his wife had called the police.

(T. 20) .

Since it was clear that the city prosecutor intended the
trial court to infer from this question that Mr. Parrish had beaten
his

wife

in

Mr. Parrish

the
if

past,

at

any

defense
time

he

counsel
had

on

ever

re-direct
beaten

his

Mr. Parrish denied that he had at any time beaten his wife.
21) .

On re-cross

examination,

the city prosecutor

asked
wife.
(T.

confronted

Mr. Parrish with a prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct, an
infraction, in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance 11.12.020,
from a few days ago.

Not content with merely bringing up the prior

conviction, the city prosecutor questioned Mr. Parrish as to his
specific conduct in the case.
Specifically, the prosecutor tried to characterize the
Disorderly

Conduct

conviction

as

involving

a

finding

that

Mr. Parrish had threatened his wife or engaged in some sort of
threatening behavior toward his wife. (T. 21).

Mr. Parrish then

admitted that he was found guilty of disturbing the peace and not
threatening his wife.

Again the prosecutor questioned him further
6

as

to

his

conduct

on

that

occasion

attempting

to

elicit

an

admission that Mr. Parrish had engaged in fighting, threatening,
and tumultuous behavior.

(T. 21) .

When Mr. Parrish denied the

allegations, the city prosecutor confronted him with the fact that
she had prosecuted that case as well, inferring that she knew the
facts to be otherwise.
At this point, Mr. Parrish's counsel objected to the
prosecutor's reference to the prior case on the grounds that it was
intended to be character evidence and was, therefore, inadmissible,
and even if it were admissible, under Rule 4 03, the probative value
was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect.

(T. 22).

The city argued that Mr. Parrish had opened the door to this line
of questioning by testifying that he expected to be arrested, that
he had been arrested three times before, and that he had never
beaten his wife.

The city further argued that because Mr. Parrish

had denied threatening his wife, evidence of his prior conviction
for Disorderly Conduct could be used to impeach his credibility.
(T. 22).
The

trial

court

overruled

Mr.

Parrish's

objection,

reasoning that Mr. Parrish did open the door and, therefore, the
prior conviction was a legitimate area of cross-examination.
addition, the court

found that the prejudice

In

involved did not

outweigh the probative value of the evidence. (T. 23).
Commenting

that

this

case

ultimately

came

down

to

deciding the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court found
Mr. Parrish guilty of Battery, a class B misdemeanor.
7

(T. 27) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court committed reversible error by admitting
evidence of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct.
Evidence of his prior conviction is not admissible under Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence or Rule 608(b) of the Rules of
Evidence.

It is clear that the city introduced Mr. Parrish's prior

conviction intending to show that he had a violent temper and that
on this occasion he acted in conformity with his violent character.
Additionally,

the

trial

court

erred

in

ruling

that

Mr. Parrish opened the door to cross examination of his prior
conviction of Disorderly Conduct.

Mr. Parrish denied beating or

threatening his wife in the past.

He admitted that he was guilty

of disturbing the peace.

Evidence of the prior conviction for

Disorderly Conduct cannot be characterized as rebuttal evidence as
it did not directly contradict his statements.

Disorderly Conduct

covers a wide range of behavior which includes disturbing the peace
and need not necessarily involve violent or threatening behavior.
Furthermore, even if Mr. Parrish's prior conviction was
admissible under Rule 404(b) or Rule 608(b), Rule 403 of the Rules
of Evidence bars its introduction because the prejudicial effect of
such

evidence

Evidence

of

substantially

Mr.

probative value.
of

Disorderly

Parrish's

outweighs
prior

it's

conviction

value.

has

little

very

The mere fact that Mr. Parrish had been convicted

Conduct

a

few days prior

is

immaterial

question of whether he was guilty of Battery
incident.

probative

to

the

in an unrelated

Evidence of his prior conviction was not probative to
8

his credibility as it is not a crime of dishonesty and did not
contradict Mr. Parrish7s assertion that he had never beaten his
wife in the past.
Lastly,

the

introduction

of

Parrish7s

Mr.

prior

conviction for Disorderly Conduct was reversible error as there is
a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings.

Aside from the complainant's testimony, the city had

no independent evidence to support it 7 s case.

The city's entire

case hinged upon the credibility of the complainant's testimony,
and discrediting Mr. Parrish7s testimony.

While it is reasonable

to expect a judge in a bench trial to exercise greater discipline
of mind than a jury, it is unreasonable to assume that evidence
that Mr. Parrish had been involved in altercations with his wife in
the past

did

not

credibility.

affect

the

trial

For this reason, the

judge's

assessment

likelihood

of

his

of a different

outcome to the trial is sufficiently high to undermine confidence
in the verdict.

9

ARGUMENT
I.
MR. PARRISH'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
DISORDERLY CONDUCT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER
RULE 404(b).
The trial court erred in admitting Mr. Parrish's prior
conviction for Disorderly Conduct.

Rule 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.
It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes such as proof of
motive,
opportunity,
intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake, or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
It

is

clear

that

the

city

sought

to

introduce

Mr.

Parrish's prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct in an attempt to
show that he had a propensity to commit violent acts towards his
wife.

Proof that Mr. Parrish had been involved in some type of

altercation with his wife on a prior occasion could serve no other
conceivable purpose.

These were two entirely unrelated incidents.

The fact that Mr. Parrish might have been guilty of Disorderly
Conduct in the past is not probative as to whether he was guilty of
committing Battery against his wife on a later date. Mr. Parrish's
prior disputes with his wife are not probative to his intent on
this occasion.

State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 427-28

(Utah

1989).
In

sum,

no

legitimate

reason

existed

to

introduce

evidence of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction of Disorderly Conduct.
Rule 404(b) limits the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes
due to the tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because
10

of his bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty
of the offense charged. "Because of this tendency, such evidence is
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the
evidence other than to show criminal disposition the evidence is
excluded".

State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

II.
MR. PARRISH DID NOT "OPEN THE DOOR" TO
CROSS EXAMINATION OF HIS PRIOR CONVICTION FOR
DISORDERLY CONDUCT UNDER RULE 608(b).
Mr.

Parrish's

denial

that

he

had

ever

beaten

or

threatened his wife did not open the door to introduction of his
prior conviction for Disorderly Conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b).
Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the
witnesses' credibility other than conviction
of crime as provided in Rule 609 may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may,
however, in the discretion of the Court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
be inquired into on cross examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witnesses character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which
character the witness being cross examined has
testified.
Utah R. Evid. 608(b).
It is a well settled rule that when a defendant chooses
to testify in his own defense he is subject to being impeached.
Impeachment

may

include cross examination which would tend to

contradict his credibility.

Such evidence may be introduced to

impeach the defendant's credibility even if it is also evidence of
a prior bad act that would not otherwise be admissible.
11

State v.

Reed, 820 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 626
P.2d 483, 485-86
(Utah

1979).

(Utah 1981); State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810, 812
However,

Mr. Parrish's

prior

conviction

for

Disorderly Conduct does not contradict his assertion that he has
never beaten or threatened his wife and for that reason is not
admissible to impeach his testimony under Rule 608(b).

Disorderly

Conduct, under the Salt Lake City Code, is an offense against
public order not an offense against persons.

Pursuant to Salt Lake

City ordinance 11.12.020, a person is guilty of Disorderly Conduct
if he:
1. Refuses to comply with the lawful order of
the police to move from a public place, or
knowingly creates a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which serves no
legitimate purpose; or
2.
Intending
to
cause
inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a
risk thereof:
a.
engages in fighting or in
violent, tumultuous, or threatening
behavior; or
b.
makes unreasonable noises in a
private place which can be heard in
a public place, or maliciously or
wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet
of another or of any neighborhood or
family by loud or unusual noise or
by discharging firearms of any
description, or by
threatening,
traducing, quarreling, challenging
to fight, or fighting, or by use of
profane or blasphemous language; or
c. obstructs vehicular or pedestrian
traffic; or
3.
Uses insulting, obscene, or profane
language in a place or under circumstances
12

which could cause a breach of the peace of
good order of the city.
It is clear that Disorderly Conduct covers a very wide
range of behavior.

When confronted with his prior conviction for

this offense, Mr. Parrish admitted to disturbing the peace.

It was

improper for the city prosecutor to attempt to use this prior
conviction to impeach Mr. Parrish's assertion that he had never
beaten or threatened his wife.

The prosecutor cannot pick and

choose among the many types of conduct covered under this ordinance
in an attempt to circumvent Rule 404(b) and introduce otherwise
inadmissible evidence.

It is not at all clear that Mr. Parrish's

conviction for Disorderly Conduct involved any kind of behavior
which

contradicts

his

threatened his wife.

assertion

that

he

had

never

beaten

or

No evidence was submitted by the city to

indicate whether Mr. Parrish's conviction for Disorderly Conduct
was based on threatening behavior or simply a loud and quarrelsome
family fight.
This case is, therefore, distinguishable from the abovecited cases. In Reed, Lopez, and Wells, prior bad act evidence was
admitted which directly conflicted with the defendant's assertions.
For example, in Reed, the defendant testified that he did not use
drugs.

A

police

paraphernalia

in

officer's
the

impeachment evidence.

testimony

defendant's

house

of

discovery

was

thus

of

drug

admissible

In Lopez, the defendant denied on direct

having kicked someone in the head in a fight which was related to
the current case at trial.

Therefore, testimony of a state's

rebuttal witness that the defendant had kicked another person in
13

the head during that incident was proper.

And, again, in Wells,

the Court held that evidence directly contradicting the defendant's
assertion that he had never pointed a weapon at the victim before
was proper.
Unlike all of these cases, Mr. Parrish's prior conviction
for Disorderly Conduct was not proper rebuttal evidence as it did
not contradict his testimony on direct.
allowing the city to introduce

The trial court erred by

inadmissible character

evidence

under the guise of impeachment evidence.

III. EVEN IF MR. PARRISH'S PRIOR CONVICTION
FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER
RULES 404(b) OR 608(b), THE EVIDENCE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED BECAUSE THE PROBATIVE VALUE
IS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE DANGER OF
UNFAIR PREJUDICE.
The

trial

court

erred

in

refusing

to

exclude

Mr. Parrish's conviction for Disorderly Conduct pursuant to Rule
403.

Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its
probative
value
is
substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 403.
This Court has considered several factors when balancing
the probativeness

of

evidence

against

its prejudicial

These factors include:
The strength of the evidence as to the
commission
of
the
other
crime,
the
similarities between the crimes, the interval
14

effect.

of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
O'Neal, 848 P.2d at 701.
In this case, both the prior conviction and the current
charge involved the same complainant and were similar in that both
incidents

arose

out

of

domestic

disputes.

Because

of

these

similarities the risk was unjustifiably high that the fact finder
would unfairly characterize Mr. Parrish as someone who routinely
terrorized his wife.

Such hostility toward Mr. Parrish unfairly

undermined his testimony.

The prejudice against Mr. Parrish is

exacerbated by the fact that the only defense he could offer was
his word against that of his wife's.

Lastly,

evidence of Mr.

Parrish's prior conviction was not crucial to the city's case.
Evidence of the prior incident shed no light on the events which
led to the later charge of Battery.
In sum, the trial court unreasonably concluded that the
probative value of the conviction was not outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice and, thus, erred in admitting the evidence.

IV.
THE ADMISSION OF MR. PARRISH'S PRIOR
CONVICTION FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT WAS NOT
HARMLESS ERROR.
The

trial

court's

admission

of

Mr.

Parrish's

prior

conviction for Disorderly Conduct was not harmless error. Harmless
errors are "errors which, although properly preserved below and
presented on appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that . . .
15

there is no reasonable

likelihood that the error affected

outcome of the proceedings".
(Utah 1992) .

the

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240

An error requires reversal when the likelihood of a

different outcome is sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict.

Jd.

In making this determination the Court should

consider a number of factors
witness'

testimony

to

the

the

city's

complainant's allegation.
was

there

any

"the importance of the

prosecution's

strength of the state's case."
Here,

including

case

and

the

overall

Id.

evidence

consisted

solely

of

the

There were no independent witnesses nor

physical

evidence.

Clearly,

evidence

that

Mr. Parrish had allegedly been involved in a prior domestic dispute
with his wife was devastating.

Since Mrs. Parrish's testimony was

the only evidence before the court, evidence of the prior incident
was so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
While it is safe to assume that a "trial court will be
somewhat more discriminating in appraising both the competency and
the effect properly to be given evidence," it is unreasonable to
assume that the admission was harmless error simply because the
case was tried to the bench and not to a jury.
P. 2d

at

431.

This

case

hinged

on

a

credibility of the two witnesses involved.

Featherson, 781

determination

of

the

One can safely assume

that the trial court, in theory, understood the limited purpose of
the introduction of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction. However, it is
quite another matter to reasonably expect the court to successfully
execute the mental gymnastics required to reach that result.
16

As

disciplined as the trial court's thinking may have been, it is
expecting too much of any human being in a case as close as this
one

to

completely

ignore

allegations

that

previously threatened or abused his wife.

Mr.

Parrish

had

In the absence of any

other evidence, admission of Mr. Parrish's prior conviction for
Disorderly Conduct constituted prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
Based
Mr. Parrish,

on

the

respectfully

foregoing
moves

argument

this

Court

the
to

defendant,
reverse

his

conviction for Battery, a class B misdemeanor, and remand this case
for a new trial.

S

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1994

/

^6

^L

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

TEXT OF PERTINENT RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

Utah Rule of Evidence 404 provides:
Rule 404.
Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of character is not
admissible
for the purpose
of proving
action
in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except;
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same.
(2) Character of victim.
Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait
of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness.
Evidence of the
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607,
608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
Utah Rule of Evidence 608 provides:
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character.
The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence
of truthful character is admissible only after the character

of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion
or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific
instances of conduct.
Specific
instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in
the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by
any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the
accused's or the witness' privilege against
selfincrimination when examined with respect to matters which
relate only to credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive
to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness
either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.

